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Abstract
Discounted Expected Utility theory has been a workhorse in
economic analysis for over half a century. However, it cannot ex-
plain empirical violations of `dimensional independence' demon-
strating that risk interacts with time preference and time interacts
with risk preference, nor does it explain present bias or magnitude-
dependence in risk and time preferences, or correlations between
risk preference, time preference, and cognitive reﬂection. We demon-
strate that these and other anomalies are explained by a dual sys-
tem model of risk and time preferences that uniﬁes models of a
rational economic agent, models based on prospect theory, and
dual process models of decision making.
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1 Introduction
Many decisions in life involve uncertain outcomes that materialize at diﬀer-
ent points in time. For example, the struggle to kick an addiction involves
a tradeoﬀ between short term gratiﬁcation and an increased risk to future
health. Saving for retirement involves delaying immediate consumption to
guard against uncertainty about future income. Whether to pursue a long-
term project involves consideration of the time the project is expected to take
and the likelihood of project success. The decision to purchase a warranty
on an appliance involves a higher immediate cost, but reduced product break-
down risk. The decision to take a `buy-it-now' option on eBay or wait until the
auction ends for the chance of a better deal, the decision to purchase a laptop
today or wait for a potential Black Friday sale, and the decision to take out a
mortgage on a home or wait for a possibly lower interest rate each involve a
tradeoﬀ between a certain, immediate payoﬀ and a risky, delayed payoﬀ.
As these examples illustrate, decisions often involve both risk and delays.
Yet the domains of risk and time have traditionally been studied separately.
In cases where risk and time preferences are both considered, the discounted
expected utility (DEU) model remains a major workhorse for analyzing indi-
vidual behavior. There are, however, a variety of basic shortcomings of DEU.
For instance, it implies that risk has no eﬀect on time preference, that delays
have no eﬀect on risk preference, that risk and time preferences are generated
by the same utility function, that people are risk-seeking toward lotteries over
uncertain payment dates, that people discount the future exponentially, and
that discounting does not depend on the magnitude of outcomes. All of these
predictions have been contradicted by experimental evidence.
In this paper, we introduce a dual process model of choices under risk
and over time that resolves each of these limitations of the DEU model. The
model generalizes both rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982), and
Mukherjee's (2010) dual system model of choice under risk to develop a uniﬁed
model that accounts for attitudes toward risk, attitudes toward time, and
systematic interaction eﬀects between risk and time preferences. The proposed
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model also provides a uniﬁcation of three classes of decision models  rank-
dependent utility, expected utility, and dual process (or dual selves) theories.
We refer to the model developed here as Dual Process Utility (DPU) theory.
The DPU model introduces a new parameter into the analysis of eco-
nomic decision models which represents the decision maker's `cognitive type'
or `thinking style'. Essentially, an agent's `cognitive type' identiﬁes whether
a person naturally engages in more intuitive and feeling-based processing or
relies on more analytical and calculation-based processing. While cognitive
types have been found to correlate with a wide variety of economic behaviors
including risk and time preferences (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Burks et al., 2009),
saving behavior (Ballinger et al., 2011), strategic sophistication (Carpenter et
al., 2013), and eﬃciency in experimental asset markets (Corgnet et al., 2015),
they appear nowhere in the conventional economic models of individual choice.
After providing some background in 2, the DPU model is introduced in
3. In 4 we demonstrate that DPU explains present bias and that DPU re-
solves a long-standing paradox in decision theory by simultaneously predicting
both the magnitude eﬀect for choice over time and peanuts eﬀect for choice
under risk. In 5, we show that DPU explains empirically observed inter-
action eﬀects between risk and time preferences that violate the principle of
dimensional independence which is implicitly assumed by the leading rational
and behavioral models of decision making. In 6 we demonstrate that DPU
predicts (i) a separation between risk and time preferences, (ii) a preference
for diversifying payoﬀs across time, (iii) risk aversion toward timing risk, (iv)
observed correlations between risk preference, time preference, and cognitive
reﬂection, and (v) the observed non-monotonic relation between cognitive re-
ﬂection and present bias. The behaviors implied by the model are summarized
in 7. Related literature is discussed in 8. Concluding remarks are provided
in 8. Proofs are provided in the appendix. To preview our results, we note
that this paper makes the following contributions:
1. General formulation of System 1 and System 2 processes in
decision making: We provide a formal link between the System 1 / System
2 paradigm often discussed qualitatively and predictions regarding economic
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behavior by postulating that System 1 has standard `behavioral' preferences
whereas System 2 has standard `rational' preferences, and that these two sys-
tems interact when making decisions (modeled by a convex combination of
rational and behavioral preferences).
2. Explaining empirical violations of dimensional independence:
A byproduct of our formulation is that the DPU model provides a simple and
general approach to predicting and explaining empirical violations of the di-
mensional independence axiom that cannot be explained by standard rational
preferences or behavioral preferences. Surprisingly, under our approach the
violations of dimensional independence are predicted in the direction observed
in experiments by combining the standard rational and behavioral models.
Moreover, each violation of dimensional independence explained by DPU, can
only be explained due to the interaction between System 1 and System 2 (con-
vex combination parameter strictly between 0 and 1), and thus cannot be
explained by any multiplicatively separable model that multiplies a discount
function by a probability weighting function by a utility or value function.
3. Explaining correlations between preferences and `cognitive
types': The convex combination parameter that places a weight on the Sys-
tem 2 value function can be viewed as indexing the decision maker's thinking
style or `cognitive type'  the extent to which the decision maker naturally
relies on reﬂective System 2 processes or intuitive System 1 processes in de-
cision making. The DPU model then implies that the agent's cognitive type
is correlated with risk and time preferences. In particular, agents with higher
`cognitive types' are predicted to be more patient and to be closer to risk-
neutrality, These predictions are supported by recent experimental evidence.
In doing so, the DPU model incorporates a factor (thinking style or cogni-
tive type) that appears nowhere in conventional economic models of decision
making but which accounts for observed heterogeneity in economic behavior.
4. Resolving the peanuts eﬀect/magnitude eﬀect paradox: Since
the work of Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), it has been generally assumed
that no model of risk and time preferences can explain the peanuts eﬀect in
choices under risk (switching from risk seeking at low stakes to risk aversion at
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high stakes) and the magnitude eﬀect for choice over time (increasing patience
at larger stakes). In fact, the most commonly used speciﬁcation of prospect
theory with a power value function does not explain the peanuts eﬀect for any
probability weighting function and the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
does not explain the magnitude eﬀect. The challenge becomes even greater
when developing a model of both risk and time preferences since the peanuts
eﬀect appears to reveal decreasing sensitivity to payoﬀs at larger stakes while
the magnitude eﬀect appears to reveal increasing sensitivity to payoﬀs at larger
stakes. We show that this paradox is resolved under our approach and that
the DPU model predicts both the peanuts eﬀect and the magnitude eﬀect.
5. Explaining general violations of discounted expected utility
theory: We demonstrate that DPU also allows for a separation of risk prefer-
ences and inter-temporal substitution, and that it predicts present bias, aver-
sion to timing risk, and a preference for diversifying risks across time.
2 Background
The study of risk preferences and time preferences, both analytically and em-
pirically, has been the primary focus of research on individual choice for over
half a century. However, although expected utility theory was axiomatized
by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1947, and discounted utility theory was
axiomatized by Koopmans in 1960, it was not until 1991 when researchers
identiﬁed remarkable parallels between anomalous behaviors across both do-
mains  such as a common ratio eﬀect in choice under risk and a common
diﬀerence eﬀect in choice over time (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991). However,
even in pointing out parallel behaviors between risk and time, Prelec and
Loewenstein also presented a kind of impossibility result, indicating that no
model could resolve both the peanuts eﬀect in choice under risk (Markowitz,
1952) and the magnitude eﬀect in choice over time (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1991). Prototypical examples of both of these eﬀects are illustrated in Ta-
ble I. For the peanuts eﬀect, preferences switch from risk-seeking at small
stakes (e.g., preferring a 1% chance of winning $100 to $1 for certain) to risk-
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averse at larger stakes (preferring $100 for certain over a 1% chance of winning
$10,000). For the magnitude eﬀect, behavior switches from impatient at small
stakes (e.g., preferring $7 now to $10 in one year) to more patient at larger
stakes (preferring $1,000 in one year over $700 now). Both eﬀects involve scal-
ing outcomes up by a common factor. The peanuts eﬀect is not explained by
the most widely used speciﬁcation of cumulative prospect theory due to Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992) with a power value function, even when allowing
for any probability weighting function. A more fundamental challenge when
relating risk and time preferences is that the peanuts eﬀect seems to reveal
decreasing sensitivity to payoﬀs at larger stakes, while the magnitude eﬀect
seems to reveal increasing sensitivity to payoﬀs at large stakes. Thus, any
conventional approach to explaining the peanuts eﬀect should predict the op-
posite of the magnitude eﬀect (and vice versa). Prelec and Loewenstein could
not explain both eﬀects, and this challenge has remained unresolved over the
subsequent twenty-ﬁve years, posing an apparent impossibility result that no
common approach to modeling risk and time preferences can capture both of
these basic behaviors. Somewhat surprisingly, we will demonstrate that the
model presented here simultaneously predicts both eﬀects. Since the `common
approach' to risk and time preferences pioneered by Prelec and Loewenstein
(1991), other models have emerged to explain behaviors across both domains.
For instance, models of similarity judgments apply the same cognitive process
to explain anomalies for risk and time (Rubinstein 1988; Leland 1994; Leland
2002; Rubinstein, 2003). However, this approach does not address another
basic question of how risk and time preferences interact.
2.1 Violations of Dimensional Independence
It has been only fairly recently that attention has shifted to explaining interac-
tions between risk and time preferences. This research direction was partially
spurred by experimental studies from Keren and Roelofsma (1995) and Bau-
cells and Heukamp (2010) who each observed diﬀerent and systematic interac-
tions between risk and time preferences. For instance, Keren and Roelofsma
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(1995) observed that uncertainty induces more patient behavior. Baucells and
Heukamp (2010) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011) both observed that time delays
induce more risk-taking behavior. Andersen et al. (2011) and Miao and Zhong
(2015) observed a preference for diversifying risks across time. Onay and On-
culer (2007) and DeJarnette et al. (2015) observed risk aversion to lotteries
over uncertain payment dates. These behaviors are illustrated in Table I.
A standard approach to modeling risk and time preferences is to multiply a
time discount function by a probability weighting function by a utility or value
function. However, this approach does not explain the ﬁnding that time delay
reduces risk aversion (see Table I) since both alternatives used by Baucells
and Heukamp (2010) are delayed by the same amount (three months) and so
the discount weights cancel when comparing options A and B. This approach
also does not explain the ﬁnding that uncertainty reduces impatience, since
both payoﬀs used by Keren and Roelofsma (1995) have the same probability
(50%), and so the probability weights cancel when comparing options A and
B. In addition, this approach does not explain the ﬁnding of subendurance
in the example by Baucells et al. (2009), since both options have the same
payoﬀs (¿100) and so the utilities cancel when comparing options A and B. It
is then not obvious how to model such interaction eﬀects between time delays,
probabilities, and payoﬀs. It may be even less clear how to derive behaviors
in the direction observed in experiments, or whether the same approach that
explains interaction eﬀects for time delays can also explain interaction eﬀects
for probabilities and payoﬀs. We will show that a uniﬁed approach to these
interaction eﬀects is possible and has a simple and intuitive interpretation.
The risk-time-money interaction eﬀects in Table I each provide a test of
the same general principle. This principle, called dimensional independence
(Keeney and Raiﬀa, 1993; Bhatia, 2016) states that two attribute dimensions
x and y are independent if for all x , y , x ′, y ′, an alternative (x , y) is chosen
over (x ′, y) if and only if (x , y ′) is chosen over (x ′, y ′). This principle reﬂects
the intuition that identical attribute values in the same dimension will cancel
in the evaluation process and not aﬀect decisions. This principle is a general
feature of the leading normative and behavioral decision models.
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Table I. Choices between Options involving Risk and Time
2.2 Dual Processes in Decision Making
Recent literature in cognitive science argues that people do not have a single
mental processing system, but rather have two families of cognitive processes.
Stanovich and West (2000), and Kahneman and Frederick (2002) label these
families neutrally as System 1 and System 2 processes where System 1 includes
automatic, intuitive and aﬀective processes and System 2 includes more de-
liberative, logical, and reﬂective processes. Kahneman (2011) simply distin-
guishes between processes that are `fast' and `slow.' Rubinstein (2007, 2013)
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distinguishes between instinctive and cognitive processes. Hsee and Rot-
tenstreich (2004) posit two qualitatively diﬀerent types of valuation processes 
valuation by feeling and valuation by calculation. We adopt the standard Sys-
tem 1/System 2 distinction in our analysis. The relation between our approach
and alternative dual system or dual selves models in economics is discussed
in 8. Despite their recent rise to theoretical prominence, two-system (dual
process) theories date back to the early days of scholarly thought. The con-
ﬂict between reason and passion, for instance, features prominently in Plato's
Republic and in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.
3 Dual Process Utility Theory
We let there be a ﬁnite set, T, of time periods, a set, M , of outcomes with
M ⊆ R, and a ﬁnite set X, of consumption sequences. We index consumption
sequences by j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and we index time periods by t ∈ {0, 1, ...,m}. A
consumption sequence xj := [xj0 , ..., xjm ] is a sequence of dated outcomes. A
stochastic consumption plan is a probability distribution over consumption se-
quences. We denote a stochastic consumption plan by a function f : X→ [0, 1],
with f (xj ) denoting the probability assigned to consumption sequence xj , where∑
x∈X f (x ) = 1. Denote the set of stochastic consumption plans by F .
Our main assumption is that System 1 has behavioral preferences (which
we formalize as discounted rank-dependent utility preferences), while System 2
has standard rational preferences (which we formalize as discounted expected
utility preferences). We will demonstrate that a by-product of our approach
is that it presents a simple way to predict and explain the empirical viola-
tions of the dimensional independence axiom in Table I, while resolving other
systematic limitations of the DEU model.
The assumption of discounted expected utility preferences seems particu-
larly appropriate for System 2 which may be intuitively thought to resemble
the rational economic agent. However, in addition to diﬀerences in the con-
tent of risk and time preferences between systems (i.e., that the systems diﬀer
in their degrees of risk aversion and impatience), one might further propose
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that the two systems diﬀer in the structure of their risk and time preferences,
with System 2 having normative DEU preferences, and with System 1 having
behavioral preferences based on prospect theory (PT) or rank dependent util-
ity (RDU) theory. Supporting this, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) ﬁnd that
inverse S-shaped probability weighting (as assumed in RDU theory (Quiggin
1982) and PT (Tversky and Kahneman 1992)) is more pronounced for aﬀect-
rich outcomes. Support for assuming System 1 has PT preferences also comes
from Barberis et al. (2013) who use PT to model System 1 thinking for
initial reactions to changes in stock prices. Reﬂecting on PT three decades
later, Kahneman (2011, pp. 281-282) remarks, It's clear now that there are
three cognitive features at the heart of prospect theory. . . They would be seen
as operating characteristics of System 1.
To formalize the risk and time preferences of System 1, let pi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
be a standard rank-dependent probability weighting function with pi(0) = 0
and pi(1) = 1, that is deﬁned as:
pi(f (xjt)) = w(f (xjt) + · · ·+ f (x1t))− w(f (xj−1,t) + · · ·+ f (x1t)),
for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, where consumption sequences are ranked according to
the discounted utility for System 1 for each sequence such that
∑
t δ
t
1u1(xnt) ≤
...≤∑t δt1u1(x1t).We assume System 1 has discounted RDU preferences. That
is, System 1 evaluates stochastic consumption plans according to (1):
V1(f ) =
∑
t
∑
j
δt1pi(f (xjt))u1(xjt) (1)
We assume System 2 has discounted expected utility preferences in (2):
V2(f ) =
∑
t
∑
j
δt2 f (xjt)u2(xjt) (2)
10
Deﬁnition 1 (Dual Process Utility Theory): In Dual Process Utility
(DPU) theory, there exists utility functions u1 , u2 , discount factors, δ1 < δ2,
probability weighting function, pi, and a unique parameter, θ ∈ [0, 1], such that
for any f , g ∈ F , f % g if and only if V(f ) ≥ V(g), where V(f ) is given by (3),
V1 is given by (1), and V2 is given by (2):
V(f ) = (1− θ)V1(f ) + θV2(f ) (3)
In (3), the parameter θ may be interpreted as the degree to which an agent
is hard-wired to rely on System 2. We will refer to θ as the decision maker's
cognitive type, with one's cognitive type becoming less based on feeling and
intuition and more reliant on logic and calculation as θ increases. From a
neuro-economic perspective, there are tight neural connections between the
prefrontal cortex, a brain region implicated in planning, analytical thinking,
and executive function and the limbic system, an evolutionarily older brain
region involved in the generation of emotions and the experience of pleasure.
One might view θ as indexing the strength of neural connections in the pre-
frontal areas relative to the strength of neural connections in the limbic areas.
Note that DPU adopts the view of cognitive types implicit in the interpre-
tation of the cognitive reﬂection test (Frederick, 2005) and models of level-k
thinking (Camerer et al., 2004), namely that there are reﬂective thinkers or
those with high levels of reliance on System 2, and there are intuitive thinkers
or those with high levels of reliance on System 1. It is in this sense in which
we view θ as reﬂecting a decision maker's `cognitive type' which allows for
heterogeneity across agents. Within agents, DPU reﬂects a compromise be-
tween the System 1 preference for immediate gratiﬁcation and the more patient
preferences of System 2. This `compromise' is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Andersen et al. (2008) who . . . observe what appears to be the outcome of a
decision process where temptation and long-run considerations are simultane-
ously involved.
To apply the model, we make simplifying assumptions regarding the pref-
erences of System 2. Mukherjee (2010) and Loewenstein et al. (2015) both
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argue that risk-neutrality is a plausible, and even natural, assumption for Sys-
tem 2. To the extent that System 2 characterizes an idealized rational agent,
it appears at least plausible that it does not have a pure rate of time pref-
erence which some authors have argued to be irrational (e.g., Harrod, 1948;
Traeger, 2013), and that it maximizes expected value. In Sections 4, 5, and 6,
we illustrate DPU under the risk-neutrality and delay-neutrality assumptions
for System 2. Formally, this means that we set u2(xjt) = xjt , and δ2 = 1. This
simpliﬁcation also serves to restrict the number of free parameters. Let E[f ]
denote the undiscounted expected value of a stochastic consumption plan f .
To simplify notation, when applying DPU in Sections 4, 5, and 6, we also now
drop the subscripts on the System 1 utility function and discount factor. The
DPU functional form in (3) now simpliﬁes to (4):
V(f ) = θE[f ] + (1− θ)
∑
t
∑
j
δtpi(f (xjt))u(xjt) (4)
The DPU model in (4) is represented by a discount factor, probability
weighting function, and utility function for System 1, as well as the decision
maker's cognitive type, θ. Model (4) is thus a two-parameter generalization of
the discounted expected utility model.
3.1 A Simple Dual Process Utility Theorem
Recent impossibility results (Mongin and Pivato, 2015; Zuber, 2016) have
demonstrated diﬃculties in using axiomatic methods to aggregate non-expected
utility preferences. For instance, Zuber (2016) considers a general class of non-
expected utility preferences and concludes, non-expected utility preferences
cannot be aggregated consistently. As such, it is not clear whether the gen-
eral form of the DPU model in (3) can be characterized from more primitive
assumptions. As we show in this section, however, we can obtain a simple
and natural characterization of the special case of (3) in which both systems
have consistent DEU preferences and diﬀer only in their degrees of risk aver-
sion and impatience. This special case of the model delivers all of our results
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except for those that emerge due to non-linear probability weighting. Under
this approach, the assumption of discounted expected utility preferences for
each system can be viewed as postulating that each system has consistent risk
and time preferences, and that inconsistencies that we observe are emergent
phenomena that arise through the interaction between systems.
Formally, we take a semi-axiomatic approach. Let %s and s denote weak
and strict preference, respectively, between pairs of stochastic consumption
plans for system s , s ∈ {1, 2} that satisfy the non-triviality conditions f 1 g
and f ′ 2 g ′ for some f , g , f ′, g ′ ∈ F .
Assumption 1 (Preferences of Systems 1 and 2): Each system
s , s ∈ {1, 2}has consistent risk and time preferences represented by discounted
expected utility theory. That is, there exists utility functionsus , s , s ∈ {1, 2}
and discount factors δs , s , s ∈ {1, 2} such that for each s , s ∈ {1, 2} and for all
f , g ∈ F , f %s g ⇐⇒ Vs(f ) ≥ Vs(g), where:
Vs(f ) =
∑
t
∑
j
δts f (xjt)us(xjt) (5)
Let % and  represent, respectively, weak and strict preferences of the
decision maker over stochastic consumption plans. We minimally constrain the
agent's time preferences, allowing for a very general time preference functional.
In particular, we do not impose stationarity, nor do we impose that time
preferences are multiplicatively separable into a discount function and a utility
function. Formally, our Assumptions 2 and 3 can be viewed as special cases
of Assumptions 2 and 3 in Harsanyi's (1955) theorem, as presented in Keeney
and Nau (2011) in the domain of choice under uncertainty.
Assumption 2 (Preferences of the Decision Maker): There exists
utility function ut , such that for all f , g ∈ F , f % g ⇐⇒ V(f ) ≥ V(g), where:
V(f ) =
∑
t
∑
j
f (xjt)ut(xjt) (6)
Our ﬁnal assumption is a consistency condition which relates the prefer-
ences of each system to the preferences of the decision maker:
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Assumption 3 (Pareto Eﬃciency): For all f , g ∈ F , if both systems
weakly prefer f to g , then f % g , and if, in addition, one system strictly prefers
f to g then f  g .
Proposition 1 (Dual Process Utility Theorem): Given Assumptions
1, 2, and 3, there exists a unique constant1 θ ∈ (0, 1), utility functions u1, u2 ,
and discount factors, δ1, δ2, such that for all f , g ∈ F , f % g if and only if
V(f ) ≥ V(g), where V(f ) is given by (7) and Vs(f ), s ∈ {1, 2} is given by (5):
V(f ) = (1− θ)V1(f ) + θV2(f ) (7)
Proposition 1 derives the existence and uniqueness of the θ parameter and
provides a formal justiﬁcation for the convex combination approach. Propo-
sition 1 provides a more general preference aggregation result than Harsanyi
(1955), in that Proposition 1 simultaneously aggregates risk and time prefer-
ences. Although including both risk and time, and applying Harsanyi's theo-
rem from social choice theory to model individual choice behavior are new, the
proof for Proposition 1 follows straightforwardly from the proof of Theorem 1
in Keeney and Nau (2011). A related ﬁnding for decisions involving time but
not risk was obtained in the context of group decision making by Jackson and
Yariv (2015).
3.2 Basic Properties of DPU
Consider two stochastic consumption plans f and g , where f (xj ) and g(xj )
are the probabilities which f and g assign to consumption sequence xj , re-
spectively. Since a decision maker either receives one consumption sequence
or another and so cannot interchange components of any arbitrary sequences,
we ﬁrst seek a means of objectively ranking diﬀerent consumption sequences,
analogous to how one would rank individual outcomes. We can then extend
the standard deﬁnition of stochastic dominance from lotteries over outcomes to
1In Harsanyi's theorem, the weights on individual utilities are positive and unique up to
a common scale factor. Without loss of generality, the weights can be scaled to sum to 1 in
which case θ ∈ (0, 1) is uniquely determined.
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lotteries over consumption sequences. In particular, we say sequence xj domi-
nates sequence xk if xjt ≥ xkt for all t∈{0,1,. . . ,T}, with a strict inequality for
at least one t . We say that consumption sequences x1, ..., xn are monotonically
ordered if xj dominates xj+1 for all j∈{1,. . . ,n − 1}. For any monotonically
ordered consumption sequences x1, ..., xn , we say f (ﬁrst-order) stochastically
dominates g if F(xj ) ≤ G(xj ) for all j∈{1,. . . ,n}, where F and G are the cumu-
lative distribution functions for f and g , respectively. Note that this reduces
to the standard deﬁnition of stochastic dominance in an atemporal setting.
Proposition 2: Let % have a DPU representation as in (3). Then for any
ﬁxed θ ∈ [0, 1], % is transitive and complete and satisﬁes ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance.
The proof of transitivity and completeness in Proposition 3 are standard so
we prove only stochastic dominance. Recall that sequenes are ranked such that∑
t δ
t
1u1(xnt) ≤ ...≤
∑
t δ
t
1u1(x1t) prior to applying the pi(.) transformation.
Note that if consumption sequences x1, ..., xn are monotonically ordered, then
u1(x1t) ≥ ... ≥ u1(xnt) for all t ∈{0,1,. . . ,T}, and for any increasing function
u1. Thus, pi(.) preserves the monotonic ordering of the sequences. If f stochas-
tically dominates g , then δt1
∑
j pi(f (xj ))u1(xjt) > δ
t
1
∑
j pi(g(xj ))u1(xjt), for each
period t ∈{0,1,. . . ,T}, which implies that V1(f ) > V1(g). Since V2(f ) > V2(g),
the convex combination of V1 and V2 ranks f higher than g for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
4 Expected and Discounted Utility Violations
In this and the following sections, all propositions assume the decision maker
has dual process utility preferences (given by (4)). Proofs of Propositions in
4 and 5 are given in the appendix. Each of these results (Propositions 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, and 8) do not hold when θ = 0 or θ = 1, indicating the need for a dual
process paradigm in our setup. First, we show that DPU resolves two empirical
violations of discounted utility theory - present bias and the magnitude eﬀect.
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4.1 Present Bias
Systematic empirical violations of the stationarity axiom of discounted utility
theory (Koopmans, 1960), such as present bias, have been well-documented in
experiments (Frederick et al., 2002), and are thought to reveal time-inconsistent
preferences (Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Formal accounts of
present bias and hyperbolic discounting have often directly assumed such be-
havior in the functional form of the agent's preferences (e.g., Laibson 1997).
Present bias emerges as a general property of DPU without any explicit as-
sumptions regarding hyperbolic discounting or diminishing sensitivity to de-
lays. In fact, present bias is predicted by DPU even though each system has
time consistent preferences. A similar result in the context of group decision
making was shown by Jackson and Yariv (2015).
Let (c, p, t) denote a stochastic consumption plan which has one non-zero
outcome, c, to be received with probability p at time t . We have the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2 (Present Bias): Present bias holds if for all y ∈ (0, c), and
t ,∆> 0, (y , p, 0) ∼ (c, p,∆) implies (y , p, t) ≺ (c, p, t + ∆).
Proposition 3: Under DPU, present bias holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 3 implies that DPU explains the example of the common dif-
ference eﬀect illustrated in Table I demonstrated by Keren and Roelofsma
(1995). In particular, a decision maker indiﬀerent between 100 Dutch guilders
for sure now and 110 Dutch guilders for sure in 4 weeks will strictly prefer
110 Dutch guildrs for sure in 30 weeks over 100 Dutch guilders for sure in 26
weeks.
It is also clear from the proof of Proposition 3 that present bias does not
hold if θ = 0 or θ = 1. Thus, under DPU, present bias arises due to the inter-
action between System 1 and System 2. This implication of DPU generates a
strong empirical prediction: While time consistent discount rates will be posi-
tively correlated with cognitive types, present bias will not be correlated with
cognitive types since it is observed for intermediate values of θ. Although this
prediction may seem counter-intuitive, it has experimental support. Bradford
et al. (2014) tested for a relationship between performance on the cognitive
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reﬂection test of Frederick (2005) and the time consistent and present bias pa-
rameters in Laibson's (1997) model of present bias. Bradford et al. report, ...
we ﬁnd that more patient individuals are more likely to answer each question
correctly. However, the present bias discount factor β is uncorrelated with the
CRT questions (p. 19). Indeed, they ﬁnd that the time consistent component
parameter of the quasi-hyperbolic model, δ, is positively correlated with cogni-
tive types at a p-value less than 0.01, although the present bias parameter β is
not related to cognitive types. Both of these ﬁndings conﬁrm the predictions
of DPU.
4.2 The Magnitude Eﬀect
The DPU model also oﬀers an explanation of the magnitude eﬀect in intertem-
poral choice. The magnitude eﬀect is the robust observation that behavior is
more patient for larger rewards than for smaller rewards (Prelec and Loewen-
stein, 1991). Formally:
Deﬁnition 3 (Magnitude Eﬀect): The magnitude effect holds if for all
y ∈ (0, c), s > t , and r > 1, (y , p, t) ∼ (c, p, s) implies (ry , p, t) ≺ (rc, p, s).
Proposition 4: For any concave power utility function u, the magnitude
eﬀect holds under DPU, if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
4.3 The Peanuts Eﬀect
While PT and RDU explain violations of expected utility theory (EU) such
as the Allais paradoxes, standard speciﬁcations of PT or RDU do not explain
the `peanuts' eﬀect. An example of this behavior is a willingness to pay $1
for a one-in-ten million chance of $1 million, but prefer a sure $1000 over
a one-in-ten million chance of $1 billion. Under a power value function for
PT, indiﬀerence in the former choice implies indiﬀerence in the latter for any
probability weighting function and the peanuts eﬀect does not hold. The
problem is more challenging when incorporating both risk and time because,
since Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), it has not been clear how the magnitude
eﬀect and the peanuts eﬀect coexist. Yet DPU simultaneously predicts both
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eﬀects. The peanuts eﬀect holds since risk-seeking at small stakes is due
to overweighting low probabilities (the domain where the peanuts eﬀect is
observed) while scaling payoﬀs up shifts more weight on the System 2 value
function (if u1 is more concave than u2 ) which shifts preferences toward risk
neutrality (if u2 = x) or toward risk aversion (if u2 is concave).
Deﬁnition 4 (Peanuts Eﬀect): Let E[(y , p, t)] > E [(c, q , t)]. The peanuts
effect holds if for all y ∈ (0, c), p > q , and r > 1, (c, q , t) ∼ (y , p, t) implies
(c, q , t) ≺ (ry , p, t).
Proposition 5: For any concave power utility function u, the peanuts
eﬀect holds under DPU, if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
If System 2 is even slightly risk-averse, the peanuts eﬀect also holds when
E[(y , p, t)] = E [(c, q , t)]. In addition to resolving the peanuts and magnitude
eﬀects, DPU explains the ﬁnding in Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) that probability
weighting is more pronounced at low stakes than at high stakes. This observa-
tion holds naturally under DPU given the assumption that the System 2 value
function is closer to risk-neutrality than the System 1 value function. How-
ever, this stake-size eﬀect violates prospect theory which assumes probability
weights and outcomes are independent.
5 Risk and Time Preference Interactions
In this section, we apply DPU to explain the systematic interaction eﬀects be-
tween risk and time preferences in Table I. We show that the DPU predictions
are systematic: DPU predicts the interaction eﬀects in the direction observed
in experiments and rules out interaction eﬀects in the opposite direction.
5.1 Delay Reduces Risk Aversion
As displayed in Table I, Baucells and Heukamp (2010) found most respondents
preferred a guaranteed 9 Euros immediately over an 80% chance of 12 Euros
immediately, but chose the chance of receiving 12 Euros immediately when the
probabilities of winning were scaled down by a factor of 10. This behavior is
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an instance of the common ratio eﬀect (Allais, 1953). Baucells and Heukamp
further observed that when the receipt of payment is delayed 3 months, most
respondents preferred an 80% chance of 12 Euros over a guaranteed 9 Euros.
This ﬁnding that people are less risk-averse toward delayed lotteries was also
observed by Abdellaoui et al. (2011). The common ratio eﬀect example from
Baucells and Heukamp (2010) holds under DPU if the probability weighting
function is sub-proportional. Here we conﬁrm that DPU explains the ﬁnding
that delay reduces risk aversion which holds even if System 1's value function
is linear in probabilities. Let E[f ] denote the (undiscounted) expected value of
stochastic consumption plan f . We consider the case where the riskier lottery
has the higher expectation as in Baucells and Heukamp (2010).
Deﬁnition 5: Let E[(c, αp, t)] > E [(y , p, t)]. Delay reduces risk aversion
if for all y ∈ (0, c), α ∈ (0, 1), and s > t , (y , p, t) ∼ (c, αp, t) implies
(y , p, s) ≺ (c, αp, s).
Proposition 6: Under DPU, delay reduces risk aversion if and only if
θ ∈ (0, 1).
5.2 Uncertainty Reduces Impatience
As displayed in Table I, Keren and Roelofsma (1995) found most respondents
preferred a guaranteed 100 Dutch guilders immediately over a guaranteed 110
Dutch guilders in 4 weeks, but chose the guaranteed 110 when the receipt
of both payments was delayed an additional 26 weeks. This behavior is an
example of present bias. Keren and Roelofsma further observed that when the
chance of receiving each payment was reduced, most respondents preferred a
50% chance of 110 Dutch guilders in 4 weeks over a 50% chance of 100 now.
That is, making both options risky leads to more patient behavior, analogous
to the eﬀect of adding a constant delay to both options.
Deﬁnition 6: Uncertainty reduces impatience if for all y ∈ (0, c), t,∆ > 0,
and q < p, (y , p, t) ∼ (c, p, t + ∆) implies (y , q , t) ≺ (c, q , t + ∆).
Proposition 7: Under DPU, for any convex weighting function, w , un-
certainty reduces impatience if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
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In the example by Keren and Roelofsma in Table I, convexity of the weight-
ing function in Proposition 8 implies w(0.5) < 0.5, which implies pi(0.5)< 0.5.
This condition is a general feature of observed probability weighting func-
tions (Starmer, 2000; Wakker, 2010) and represents a form of pessimism.
This condition holds for all convex probability weighting functions as well
as for the familiar inverse-S-shaped weighting functions (such as those param-
eterized by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Prelec
(1998), and Gonzalez and Wu (1999)), Abdellaoui (2000), and Bleichrodt and
Pinto (2000)). This condition is also a general property resulting from Prelec's
(1998) axiomatic characterization of his one-parameter probability weighting
function. This condition (pi(0.5)< 0.5) will reappear in our analysis and is
the only substantive property of the weighting function that is necessary for
DPU to explain the experimental observations studied here. The more general
convexity condition is only necessary for the generalization of the behavior
observed by Keren and Roelofsma to all q < p as formalized in Deﬁnition 6.
5.3 Time Dominates at Low Stakes, Risk at High Stakes
Baucells et al. (2009) found that 81% of respondents preferred ¿100 for sure in
one month to ¿100 with 90% probability immediately, but 57% preferred ¿5,
with 90% probability immediately over ¿5 for sure, in one month. Baucells
and Heukamp (2012) refer to this behavior as subendurance and they deﬁne it
more generally as follows:
Deﬁnition 7: Subendurance holds if for all y ∈ (0, c), t,∆ > 0, and
λ ∈ (0, 1), (c, p, t + ∆) ∼ (c, λp, t) implies (y , p, t + ∆) ≺ (y , λp, t).
Proposition 8: For any concave utility function u such that u(0) = 0,
subendurance holds under DPU if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Subendurance reﬂects behavior in which time dominates at low stakes and
risk dominates at high stakes. In particular, at low stakes, people are more
sensitive to the time dimension and choose the sooner reward, whereas at larger
stakes, with the same objective tradeoﬀ between time and risk (e.g., receiving a
sure payoﬀ in one month or an immediate payoﬀ with probability 0.90), people
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are more sensitive to the risk dimension and choose the higher probability
reward. Subendurance thus reveals one way in which people directly trade oﬀ
time versus risk.
The interaction eﬀects in this section challenge a larger class of time pref-
erences than DEU. Indeed, they cannot be explained by any model of dis-
counting in which evaluation of payoﬀs, probabilities, or delays is multiplica-
tively separable. As Baucells and Heukamp (2012) note, when evaluating
a stochastic consumption plan (x , p, t), One may be tempted to propose
V(x , p, t) = w(p)f (t)v(x ). Unfortunately, this form is not appropriate because
. . . probability and time cannot be separated. One may then propose the more
general form V(x , p, t) = g(p, t)v(x ), but this fails to accommodate suben-
durance. Moreover, Ericson and Noor (2015) reject the assumption that dis-
counting and utility functions are separable for nearly 70% of their partici-
pants. Given the necessity of a seemingly complex form for evaluating (x , p, t)
to explain the observations in Table I, the DPU functional form in (4) is sur-
prisingly simple.
5.4 Variations in Risk and Time
Figure I graphs (4) for diﬀerent values of θ (within panels) and for diﬀerent
delays (across panels), as probabilities increase from 0 to 1. The ﬁgure em-
ploys Prelec's (1998) probability weighting function and evaluates a stochastic
consumption plan paying x > 0 with probability p at time t and 0 otherwise,
under the simpliﬁed case where u1 (x ) = u2 (x ) := 1 and u1 (0) = u2 (0) := 0.
This speciﬁcation may be viewed as a time-dependent probability weighting
function that becomes ﬂatter as the time horizon increases. In general, DPU
does not have a separable probability weighting function that is independent of
outcomes or time, but we can see how time aﬀects the shape of the weighting
function in the special case when u1 (.) = u2 (.).
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Figure I suggests people are less sensitive to variations in probability for
longer time horizons. Also, relative to an event's probability p, the function
over-weights low probability events with short horizons, such as weekly state
lottery drawings (if δtw(p) > p), but under-weights low probability events with
long horizons, such as natural disasters and health risks from addictions (if
δtw(p) < p). Epper and Fehr-Duda (2016) also argue that accounting for time
permits the coexistence of overweighting and underweighting tail events.
Figure I. Time Dependent Probability Weighting
For stochastic consumption plan (x , p, t) yielding $x with probability p at time t
and 0 otherwise, Figure I plots (5) for diﬀerent values of θ, diﬀerent time delays (0
to 10 periods), and diﬀerent probabilities. The parameters were set to δ = 0.8, and
w(p) = exp(−(−ln(p))α) (Prelec's one-parameter probability weighting function),
with α = 0.5. These parameter values are arbitrary and chosen for rough plausibility.
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Figure II graphs the DPU function from (4) for diﬀerent values of θ (within
each panel) and for diﬀerent probabilities (across panels), as the time horizon
increases from 0 to 10 periods, using the same parametric speciﬁcation as in
Figure I. This speciﬁcation may be viewed as a probability-dependent time
discounting function for the special case where u1 (.) = u2 (.). In Figure II, the
function becomes steeper at higher probabilities, suggesting people are less
patient as the outcome becomes more likely to be received, possibly reﬂecting
anticipation prior to a reward.
Figure II. Probability Dependent Time Discounting
For stochastic consumption plan (x , p, t) yielding $x with probability p at time t
and 0 otherwise, Figure II plots (5) for diﬀerent values of θ, diﬀerent time delays (0
to 10 periods), and diﬀerent probabilities. The parameters were set to δ = 0.8, and
w(p) = exp(−(−ln(p))α) with α = 0.5.
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6 Other Relationships between Risk and Time
We next consider four other relationships between risk and time: risk prefer-
ence and intertemporal substitution, a preference for diversifying risks across
time, aversion to timing risk, and correlations with cognitive reﬂection.
6.1 Risk Preference and Intertemporal Substitution
The DEU model uses the same utility function for risk and time. However, risk
preference and inter-temporal substitution are often observed to be distinct
(e.g., Miao and Zhong, 2015). Consider the stochastic consumption plan, f , be-
low, also considered by Miao and Zhong (2015), subject to (1 + r)c1 + c2 = 100
and (1 + r)c
′
1 + c
′
2 = 100, where r ∈ (0, 1) is an interest rate.
Figure III. A Simple Stochastic Consumption Plan
The present equivalents PE(c1, c2) and PE
′
(c
′
1, c
′
2) of consumption (c1, c2)
and (c
′
1, c
′
2), respectively, are determined such that PE/PE' at t1 is indiﬀerent
under V to receiving (c1, c2)/(c
′
1, c
′
2)on the time horizon. They are deﬁned as
PE(c1, c2) := V
−1((1− θ)(u(c1) + δu(c2)) + θ(c1 + c2)).
PE′(c
′
1, c
′
2) := V
−1((1− θ)(u(c′1) + δu(c′2)) + θ(c′1 + c′2)).
Employing rank-dependent probability weighting to aggregate the certainty
equivalent as in the Chew-Epstein-Halevy approach (see Miao and Zhong,
2015), the certainty equivalent (CE) under DPU can be expressed as
CE(f) = V−1(w(p)V(PE(c1, c2)) + w(1− p)V(PE(c′1, c
′
2))) if PE ≥ PE′.
CE(f) = V−1(w(1− p)V(PE(c1, c2)) + w(p)V(PE(c′1, c
′
2))) if PE ≤ PE′.
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This approach permits a separation between risk attitude (which is par-
tially determined by w) and inter-temporal substitution (which does not de-
pend on w).
6.2 Preference for Diversiﬁcation across Time
Miao and Zhong (2015) provide a variant of the example shown below:
Figure IV. Preference for Diversiﬁcation across Time (A % B)
We can think of the consumption sequences as being determined by the toss
of a fair coin. Then Option A pays $100 in period 0 if the coin lands heads,
and it pays $100 in period 1 if the coin lands tails. In contrast, Option B pays
$100 in both periods if the coin lands heads, and it pays $0 in both periods
if the coin lands tails. Miao and Zhong (2015) propose and ﬁnd experimental
support for the hypothesis that many people prefer Option A in which risks
are diversiﬁed across time over Option B in which they are not. Such behavior
has also been observed by Andersen et al. (2011) who refer to this preference
pattern as `correlation aversion' or `intertemporal risk aversion.'
Correlation aversion is simply explained by DPU. Note that, for Option
A, System 1 will rank consumption sequence x := (100, t = 0; 0, t = 1) higher
than the sequence y := (0, t = 0; 100, t = 1) in order of preference for all δ1 < 1.
Thus, DPU assigns weight pi(0.5) to x and (1−pi(0.5)) to y , with weights
assigned analogously for Option B. In most experimental studies of rank-
dependent probability weighting functions (see references in 5.2), it has been
found that pi(0.5)<0.5. Under DPU, with u(0) = 0,
V(A) = (1− θ)(pi(0.5)u(100) + (1− pi(0.5))δu(100)) + θ(100).
V(B) = (1− θ)(pi(0.5)(u(100) + δu(100))) + θ(100).
Hence, A is preferred to B if pi(0.5) <0.5.
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6.3 Aversion to Timing Risk
Onay et al. (2007) and DeJarnette et al. (2015) experimentally investigate
preferences over lotteries that pay a ﬁxed prize at an uncertain date. For
instance, in choices such as receiving $100 in 10 weeks for sure (Option A), or
receiving $100 in either 5 or 15 weeks with equal probability (Option B), they
ﬁnd that people are generally risk-averse toward timing risk, preferring Option
A. However, DEU and the standard models of hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting imply people will be risk-seeking toward timing risk.
Consider a choice between receiving $100 at time t (Option A), or $100
at either time t − r or time t + r with equal probability (Option B). Under
DPU, the values are:
V(A) = (1− θ)δtu(100) + θ(100).
V(B) = (1− θ)(δt−rpi(0.5)u(100) + δt+r(1− pi(0.5))u(100)) + θ(100).
For all θ ∈ [0, 1), A is preferred to B if the following inequality holds:
1 > [δ−rpi(0.5) + δr(1− pi(0.5))]
This inequality can hold if pi(0.5) < 0.5, a robust ﬁnding, noted in 5.2.
6.4 Risk and Time Preferences and Cognitive Type
The DPU model also captures observed relationships between risk preference,
time preference, and cognitive reﬂection. An agent's `cognitive type', as pa-
rameterized by θ can be interpreted as a measure of reliance on System 2
processing and, since Frederick (2005), reliance on System 2 is thought to be
correlated with cognitive reﬂection. DPU accommodates a continuum of types
- any θ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the DPU speciﬁcation in (4) predicts the following:
Remark: For a decision maker with preferences given by (4):
(i) The decision maker approaches risk-neutrality as θ increases.
(ii) The decision maker becomes more patient as θ increases.
(iii) Expected value maximization is negatively correlated with impatience.
(iv) Present bias is not monotonic in θ.
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Consistent with implications (i), (ii), and (iii), correlations between risk
neutrality, patience, and cognitive types have been observed by Frederick
(2005), Burks et al. (2009), Oechssler et al. (2009), Cokely and Kelley (2009),
Dohmen et al. (2010), and Benjamin et al. (2013). Burks et al. (2009) report
those individuals making choices just shy of risk-neutrality have signiﬁcantly
higher CS [cognitive skills] than those making more either risk-averse or more
risk-seeking choices (p. 7747). However, Andersson et al. (2016) ﬁnds no
correlation between risk preferences and cognitive skills. See Dohmen et al.
(2018) for a recent review of this literature. Implication (iv) is supported by
the study of Bradford et al. (2014) who observe a strong negative correla-
tion between impatience and cognitive reﬂection but ﬁnd no relation between
present bias and cognitive reﬂection, as discussed in Section 4.1.
The notion that System 2 is closer to risk-neutrality and is more patient
than System 1 is also supported by studies which employ other means of ma-
nipulating System 1 versus System 2 processing. Placing people under a high
working memory load is one approach to inducing greater reliance on System
1. Studies have found that increased cognitive load (Deck and Jahedi, 2015;
Holger et al., 2016) increases deviations from risk-neutrality such as increased
small-stakes risk aversion and produces less patient and more impulsive be-
havior (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). Leigh (1986), Anderhub et al. (2001),
and Andersen et al. (2008) also ﬁnd that risk aversion is positively correlated
with impatience. In a large study of response times to the common ratio
eﬀect choices of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Rubinstein (2013) observed
slow responders to be signiﬁcantly more likely to choose the expected value
maximizing alternatives in both decisions than fast responders, and Kahne-
man (2011) has described the speed of cognition as a key diﬀerence between
System 1 and System 2 processing in his book, Thinking, fast and slow.
7 Summary of Results
The dual process utility model in (4) is suﬃcient to resolve each of the empir-
ical violations of the discounted expected utility model in Table II. Moreover,
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the predictions of DPU are systematic: The predicted shifts in preference are
in the direction observed in experiments. The reverse preference patterns are
not predicted. In addition, given that no model in which preferences are repre-
sented by the product of a discount function, a probability weighting function,
and a utility or value function can explain the risk-time-money interaction
eﬀects in Table II, the DPU model in (4) is surprisingly simple.
Table II. Risk and Time Anomalies Predicted by DPU Theory
8 Related Literature
Many models for decisions under risk and for decisions over time have been
developed in the past ﬁve decades and it is not feasible to review them all here.
Since models developed for only decisions under risk or for only decisions over
time cannot account for the majority of our results, we focus on models which
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consider both risk and time. Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) noted parallels
between anomalies for decisions under risk and decisions over time. Rubinstein
(1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 2002) provided models of similarity judgments
which explain key anomalies for decisions under risk and over time such as the
Allais paradox and hyperbolic discounting as arising from the same cognitive
process. However, these approaches treat risk and time independently, and
thus cannot explain interaction eﬀects between risk and time preferences.
Recent models by Halevy (2008), Walther (2010) and Epper and Fehr-Duda
(2015) focus on implications of rank-dependent utility theory when extended to
an intertemporal framework. Halevy (2008) and Walther (2010) focus primar-
ily on relationships between hyperbolic discounting over time and non-linear
probability weighting under risk. Halevy notes that his model is also consistent
with the experimental evidence of Keren and Roelofsma (1995). The obser-
vations of Keren and Roelofsma and Baucells and Heukamp (2010) are both
explained by the probability-time tradeoﬀ model of Baucells and Heukamp
(2012). However, this model applies only to a restrictive class of prospects
oﬀering a single non-zero outcome to be received with probability p at time t .
Aside from extensions of RDU to intertemporal choice, one other major
literature stream is the class of dual-selves models motivated to explain temp-
tation and self-control. A leading example in this is the model of Fudenberg
and Levine (2006, 2011, 2012) and Fudenberg et al. (2014) which can explain
the Allais paradox as well as the interactions between risk and time preferences
identiﬁed by Keren and Roelofsma and Baucells and Heukamp. However, Fu-
denberg et al. (2014) comment Unfortunately the model of Fudenberg and
Levine (2011) is fairly complex, which may obscure some of the key insights
and make it diﬃcult for others to apply the model. (p. 56). In addition, a
drawback of the model from both a normative and a descriptive viewpoint is
that it violates transitivity (Fudenberg et al., 2014), even though transitivity is
rarely violated in experiments (Baillon et al., 2014; Regenwetter et al., 2011).
Aside from the work of Fudenberg and Levine, most dual-selves models in
economics are restricted to either risk or time. For decisions involving only risk,
(5) reduces to a variant of the dual system model (DSM) of Mukherjee (2010).
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The DPU model in (4) modiﬁes the DSM by employing a rank-dependent
probability weighting function for System 1, and extends the model to encom-
pass both risk and time preferences. Rank-dependent weighting for System 1
eliminates the undesirable property that the DSM violates ﬁrst order stochas-
tic dominance. McClure et al. (2007) employ a two-system model of time
preference with two discount factors but with a single utility function. Their
approach can explain present bias, but not the magnitude eﬀect or the inter-
action eﬀects involving risk and time. Our results also relate to the ﬁnding
in the social choice literature that group discount functions are present-biased
(Jackson and Yariv, 2015). We show a similar phenomenon in a dual system
model of individual choice. However, it should be clear that DPU does not
capture all important behaviors for decisions over time. For instance, DPU
is additively separable across time periods and so does not account for com-
plementarities in consumption across time which is a hallmark of the classic
model of habit formation (e.g., Constantinides, 1990).
9 Conclusion
The DPU model was developed to formalize behaviors based on System 1 and
System 2 processes which are often discussed qualitatively. We have shown
that one natural approach to constructing such a model (in which System 1
has behavioral preferences and System 2 has rational preferences) also pre-
dicts empirical violations of the dimensional independence axiom, as well as
systematic interaction eﬀects between risk and time preferences and observed
correlations between risk preferences, time preferences, and cognitive types.
Moreover, in Propositions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 it is necessary to have the in-
teraction between systems (θ ∈ (0, 1)) for the results to hold. Hence, these
eﬀects are not explained by standard rational or behavioral preferences alone.
In addition to providing a uniﬁed approach to risk and time preferences, DPU
provides a uniﬁcation of models based on a rational agent, models based on
prospect theory or rank-dependent utility and dual system or dual selves mod-
els of behavior.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
In the proofs of Propositions 3  8, the agent is assumed to have DPU prefer-
ences from equation (4).
Proposition 3: Present bias holds if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (8) implies (9):
(8) V(y , p, 0) = (1− θ)w(p)u(y) + θpy = V(c, p,∆) = (1− θ)δ∆w(p)u(c) + θpc.
(9) (1− θ)δtw(p)u(y) + θpy < (1− θ)δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c) + θpc.
Note that since c > y , equation (9) implies that w(p)u(y) > δ∆w(p)u(c). Also
note that (8) can be rewritten as:
(1− θ)(w(p)u(y)− δ∆w(p)u(c)) = θp(c − y).
In addition, (9) can be rewritten as:
(1− θ)δt(w(p)u(y)− δ∆w(p)u(c)) < θp(c− y).
Thus, (1− θ)δt(w(p)u(y)− δ∆w(p)u(c)) < (1− θ)(w(p)u(y)− δ∆w(p)u(c)).
The above inequality holds since w(p)u(y) > δ∆w(p)u(c).
(Necessity) The agent has a constant discount factor if θ = 0 or θ = 1. 
Proposition 4: For a concave power function u, the magnitude eﬀect holds
if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (10) implies (11):
(10) V(y , p, t) = (1− θ)δtw(p)u(y) + θpy = V(c, p, s) = (1− θ)δsw(p)u(c) + θpc
(11) (1− θ)δtw(p)u(ry) + pry < (1− θ)δsw(p)u(rc) + θprc
Note that since c > y , equation (10) implies thatδtw(p)u(y) > δsw(p)u(c).
Also note that (10) can be rewritten as:
(12) (1− θ)w(p)(δtu(y)− δsu(c)) = θp(c − y)
Inequality (10) can be written as: (1− θ)w(p)(δtu(ry)− δsu(rc)) < θpr(c − y)
For concave power utility, (i.e., u(z ) = zα, with z > 0, α < 1), this becomes:
(13) (1− θ)rα(δtw(p)yα − δsw(p)cα) < θpr(c − y).
Note that by (11), we have (1− θ)(δtw(p)yα − δsw(p)cα)/θp(c − y) = 1.
Thus, (13) reduces to r > rα, which is satisﬁed since r > 1 and α < 1.
(Necessity) If θ = 0 or θ = 1, the scaling constant factors out. 
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Proposition 5: Let E[(y, p, t)] > E[(c, q, t)]. Then for any concave power
function u, the peanuts eﬀect holds under DPU if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (14) implies (15):
(14) V(y , p, t) = (1− θ)δtw(p)u(y) + θpy = V(c, q , t) = (1− θ)δtw(q)u(c) + θqc.
(15) (1− θ)δtw(p)u(ry) + θpry > (1− θ)δtw(q)u(rc) + θqrc.
For E[(y , p, t)] > E[(c, q , t)], equation (14) implies that δtw(p)u(c) > δtw(p)u(y).
Also note that (14) can be rewritten as:
(16) (1− θ)δt(w(q)u(c)− w(p)u(y)) = θ(yp − cq).
In addition, the inequality in (15) can be rewritten as:
(17) (1− θ)δt(w(q)u(rc)− w(p)u(ry)) < θr(yp − cq)
For a concave power utility function over gains, (i.e., u(z ) = zα, with z > 0, α < 1):
(18) (1− θ)δtrα(w(q)cα − w(p)yα) < θr(yp − cq).
Note that by (16), we have (1− θ)δt(w(q)u(c)− w(p)u(y))/θ(yp − cq) = 1.
Thus, (18) reduces to r > rα, which is satisﬁed since r > 1 and α < 1.
(Necessity) If θ = 0 or θ = 1, the scaling constant factors out. 
Proposition 6: Let E[(c, αp, t)] > E[(y , p, t)]. Then delay reduces risk aver-
sion if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (19) implies (20):
(19) (1− θ)δtw(p)u(y) + θpy = (1− θ)δtw(αp)u(c) + θαpc
(20) (1− θ)δsw(p)u(y) + θpy < (1− θ)δsw(αp)u(c) + θαpc.
SinceE[(c, αp, t)] > E[(y , p, t)], we have αcp > py , in which case (19) implies
that
δtw(p)u(y) > δtw(αp)u(c). Equation (19) can then be rewritten as:
(1− θ)δt(w(p)u(y)− w(αp)u(c)) = θp(αc − y).
In addition, note that the inequality in (20) can be rewritten as:
(1− θ)δs(w(p)u(y)− w(αp)u(c)) < θp(αc − y).
Thus, (1− θ)δs(w(p)u(y)− w(αp)u(c)) < (1− θ)δt(w(p)u(y)− w(αp)u(c)).
The above inequality holds since w(p)u(y) > w(αp)u(c).
(Necessity) If either θ = 0 or θ = 1, the discount factors in (19) and (20) cancel.

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Proposition 7: For any convex weighting function w , risk reduces impatience
if and only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (21) implies (22):
(21) (1− θ)δtw(p)u(y) + θpy = (1− θ)δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c) + θpc.
(22) (1− θ)δtw(q)u(y) + θqy < (1− θ)δ(t+∆)w(q)u(c) + θqc.
Note that since c > y , equation (21) implies δtw(p)u(y) > δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c),
and therefore u(y) > δ∆u(c). Also note that (21) can be rewritten as:
(1− θ)δtw(p)(u(y)− δ∆u(c)) = θp(c − y).
Note that (22) can be rewritten as:
(1− θ)δtw(q)(u(y)− δ∆u(c)) < θq(c − y).
Then by (21), ((1− θ)δt(u(y)− δ∆u(c)))/θ(c − y) = p/w(p).
By (22), ((1− θ)δt(u(y)− δ∆u(c)))/θ(c − y) < q/w(q). Thus, if w(q)/w(p) < q/p
then (21) implies (22). Since q ∈ (0, p), we can write q = kp, for k ∈ (0, 1). For
any convex w with w(0) = 0, we have w(kp + (1− k)0) < kw(p) + (1− k)w(0),
which implies w(q)/w(p) < q/p.
(Necessity) If θ = 0 or θ = 1, the probability weights in (21), (22) cancel. 
Proposition 8: For any concave u, with u(0) = 0, subendurance holds if and
only if θ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: (Suﬃciency) We need to show that (23) implies (24):
(23) (1− θ)δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c) + θpc = (1− θ)δtw(λp)u(c) + θλpc
(24) (1− θ)δ(t+∆)w(p)u(y) + θpy < (1− θ)δtw(λp)u(y) + θλpy
Since pc > λpc, equation (23) implies δtw(λp)u(c) > δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c). Also
note that (23) can be rewritten as (25) and (24) can be rewritten as (26):
(25) (1− θ)(δtw(λp)u(c)− δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c)) = θpc(1− λ)
(26) θpy(1− λ) < (1− θ)(δtw(λp)u(y)− δ(t+∆)w(p)u(y)).
From (25) and (26), for all θ ∈ (0, 1):
(δtw(λp)u(c)− δ(t+∆)w(p)u(c))y < (δtw(λp)u(y)− δ(t+∆)w(p)u(y))c.
For all θ ∈ (0, 1), the above inequality reduces to, u(c)/c < u(y)/y . Since
y ∈ (0, c), we can write y = kc, for k ∈ (0, 1). For any concave u with u(0) = 0,
we have ku(c) + (1− k)u(0) < u(kc + (1− k)0) which implies u(c)/c < u(y)/y .
(Necessity) If θ = 0 or θ = 1, the utilities cancel in (23) and (24).
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